I. Introduction
In 2000, the European Council adopted two directives, with the aim of combating "discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin" 1 and "discrimination on the grounds of religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation as regards employment and occupation". workers or employers; social protection; education and access to and supply of goods and services, which are available to the public. Racism and Xenophobia came to the conclusion that the compatibility of German laws in many sectors with the directives should be reviewed. 6 According to Art. 6 of the Race Equality Directive member states may introduce or maintain acts, which go beyond the scope of the directive. In Germany, so far there is no provision, which is more favourable regarding equal treatment than the regulations of the directives.
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The purpose of this article is to give an overview of current German regulations against discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, draft legislations and their compatibility with constitutional and European Community law. The article will focus on rules against discrimination in private and labour law. The new Federal Government wants to protect minorities and wants to achieve their equal treatment and social participation. No one must be discriminated against on grounds of his disability, origin, colour, ethnic origin or sexual orientation as gay or lesbian. 
II. Laws against Discrimination on the Grounds of Racial or Ethnic Origin

A. The Basic Law (Grundgesetz)
The starting point for an overview of German regulations against discrimination must be the German Constitution (Basic Law). According to Art. Art. 3 (3) (1) of the Basic Law entails not only a prohibition for public authorities to discriminate on grounds of race, homeland and origin; it also contains the constitutional mandate to enact regulations against direct racial discrimination. 13 The prohibition of racial discrimination can also be deduced from the right to human dignity (Art. 1 of the Basic Law).
14 Fifteenth Periodic Report to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, UN Doc. CERD 338/C/Add.14 (10 August 2000), paras. 32 -35, 78-96, 106-110. 9 In addition, Art. 33 of the Basic Law protects applicants for a position in the public service against 
B. Contents of the Draft
The Ministry of Justice planned to introduce a new sub-chapter concerning regulations against discrimination in the Civil Code. It therefore followed the traditional German approach of legislative drafting according to which all of the central provisions in private law should be included in the Civil Code. The core of the Draft Law on the Prevention of Discrimination in the Private Sector consists of five sections, which can be summarized as follows:
Prohibition of Discrimination and Justified Differentiation (Draft Section 319a and 319d of the Civil Code)
Draft Section 319a (1) (1) (a) of the Civil Code prohibits harassment and direct or indirect discrimination on grounds of gender, race, ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual identity regarding conclusion, termination and content of contracts, which are offered to the public. According to Draft Section 319a (1) (1) (b)
of the Civil Code, direct or indirect discrimination and harassment regarding contracts about occupation, healthcare and education are prohibited. Further, equal access to organizations, whose members belong to a particular profession is guaranteed.
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Section 319a applies neither to employment contracts and access to unions and employers organizations nor to family and inheritance law. 
Definitions (Draft Section 319b of the Civil Code)
Draft Section 319b of the Civil Code defines direct discrimination, indirect discrimination and harassment. Apart from the grounds of discrimination the definitions given in Draft Section 319b are similar to the definitions in Art. 2 of the Race Equality Directive.
Direct discrimination occurs when one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on grounds mentioned in Section 319a. 25 Indirect discrimination occurs where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons on grounds mentioned in Section 319a at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. 26 Harassment is a conduct related to grounds mentioned in § 319a, which takes place with the purpose or effect of violating the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment.
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Reversed Burden of Proof (Draft Section 319c of the Civil Code)
Draft Section 319c of the Civil Code lays down a rule dealing with the burden of proof. After the adoption of the draft law in pending proceedings before courts, the victim only has to make a prima facie case regarding the facts from which it can be presumed that there has been a case of discrimination. 28 The respondent has to prove that there was no case of discrimination or that the differentiation was based on reasonable or objective criteria.
Compensation (Draft Section 319e of the Civil Code)
Draft Section 319e of the Civil Code gives the victim the claim for discontinuation of the discriminatory act ( Unterlassungsanspruch), the right that the negative consequences of the act will be eliminated ( Folgenbeseitigunganspruch) and a subsidiary claim for pecuniary damages.
25 Section 319b (1) of the proposed amendment to the Civil Code. 26 Ibid., Section 319b (2). 27 Ibid., Section 319b (3). 28 A pure allegation would be insufficient, see Bundesministerium der Justiz, Diskussionsentwurf… , 44.
C. Criticism
The idea to include the anti-discrimination provisions in the Civil Code is not very · without prejudice to the right of victims and of associations, organisations or other legal entities referred to in Article 7(2), providing independent assistance to victims of discrimination in pursuing their complaints about discrimination, · conducting independent surveys concerning discrimination, · publishing independent reports and making recommendations on any issue relating to such discrimination.
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Germany has therefore the legal obligation to establish a body dealing with equal treatment. 36 So far, no concept has been developed to implement Art. 13 of the Race Equality Directive. 37 Most of the conceptual work in the implementation process still has to be done.
D. Subsequent Development
The publication of the Discussion Draft Law on the Prevention of Discrimination in 
IV. Standards for Modern Anti-Discrimination Legislation in Constitutional and European Law
A. Legal Basis for Testing the Compliance of an Anti-Discrimination Act with Higher-Ranking Law
Although it seems that the Draft Law on the Prevention of Discrimination in the Private Sector will not be adopted in the present version, some issues raised in the debate -sometimes in a very irrational way -should be clarified. The main point of criticism against the anti-discrimination draft law is that its provisions violate the Constitution, in particular the guarantee of private autonomy, freedom of action (both Art. 2 (1) of the Basic Law), the right to freely pursue an occupation (Art. 12 (1) of the Basic Law), property rights (Art. 14 of the Basic Law) and freedom of association (Art. 9 of the Basic Law). The reversed burden of proof has also been criticized.
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The question as to whether the draft law violates higher ranking law is not easy to answer. The draft law was primarily intended to implement secondary European Community law. It will be shown that as far as the Race Equality Directive has to be implemented, the legal basis for an assessment of the conformity with higher-ranking law is European Community law. As far as it is not possible to remove inconsistencies 46 Sechster Bericht der Bundesregierung ü ber ihre Menschenrechtspolitik in den auswä rtigen As long as the European Communities, in particular European Court case law generally ensure effective protection of fundamental rights as against the sovereign powers of the Communities which is to be regarded as substantially similar to the protection of fundamental rights required unconditionally by the Basic Law, and in so far as they generally safeguard the essential content of fundamental rights, the Federal Constitutional Court will no longer exercise its jurisdiction to decide on the applicability of secondary Community legislation cited as the legal basis for any acts of German courts or authorities within the sovereign jurisdiction of the Federal republic of Germany, and it will no longer review such legislation by the standard of the fundamental rights contained in the Basic Law… 51
In the Banana Market decision the court affirmed:
Constitutional complaints and submissions by courts which put forward an infringement by secondary European Community Law of fundamental rights guaranteed in the Basic Law are inadmissible from the outset if their grounds do not show that the European evolution of law, including the rulings of the European Court of Justice has resulted in a decline below the required standard of fundamental rights after the Solange II decision. The court went on:
The constitutional requirements are satisfied in accordance with the preconditions mentioned in [Solange II] if the rulings of the European Court of Justice generally ensure effective protection of fundamental rights as against the exclusive powers of the Communities which is to be regarded as substantially similar to the protection of fundamental rights required unconditionally by the Basic Law, and in so far as they generally safeguard the essential content of fundamental rights. These are in the first place "the very core of the right to freedom" and the "right to equality"; in the second place the freedom of opinion, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, the professional freedom and the right to property, although they might be interpreted differently than in national constitutions.
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While a first reading of the relevant passages in the Solange II decision might lead to the conclusion that the Federal Constitutional Court addresses only procedural issues, in fact the decisions go further. The Solange II decision has to be interpreted as a statement with a substantive effect. As long as human rights are generally protected in European Community law, secondary European Community law has primacy over fundamental rights in the Basic Law.
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The next question to be discussed is whether these principles apply only to regulations and decisions or also to directives. An answer can be found in the TabakRichtlinien Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court where it came to the following conclusion: 53 Ibid., 254. 54 Limbach, "Inter-Jurisdictional Cooperation…" , 337. 55 Ulrich Everling, "Brauchen wir 'Solange III'? -Zu den Forderungen nach Revision der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts", 25 Europarecht (1990), 195, 202. The directive … obliges the member states to implement its contents in national law, but it leaves a wide margin of appreciation. The national legislator is bound by the standards of the Basic Law. The question whether an implementation law within this margin of appreciation violates basic rights can be examined by the Constitutional Court without restrictions.
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Thus, as far a directive leaves a margin of appreciation, the legislator has to make sure, that the implementation law complies with the fundamental rights in the Basic Law. However, if a directive leaves no other option, the legislator has to deviate from the fundamental rights in the Basic Law. 57 The drafting of an anti-discrimination law must be guided by the following principles. The legislator has to find a way by which the directive can be implemented without an infringement of the basic rights. If such infringement cannot be avoided, the directive has to implemented even if the implementing act violates basic rights. But a careful consideration shows that it is possible to implement the Race Equality Directive without infringing the constitution.
C. Constitutional Law 1 Private Autonomy and Freedom of Contract
The principle of private autonomy in general and the freedom of contract is one of the most important principles in the German legal order. It is ensured by Art. Law was much narrower and did not introduce an obligation to enter into a contract.
Thus, the implementation of the Race Equality Directive will not lead to conflict between constitutional and European Community law.
The Reversed Burden of Proof
More difficulties are raised by the introduction of the principle of the reversed burden of proof. The Race Equality Directive leaves only a small margin of appreciation.
Section 319c of the proposed amendment to the Civil Code stayed therefore close to the wording of Art. 8 (1) of the Race Equality Directive, according to which "Member
States shall take such measures as are necessary, in accordance with their national judicial systems, to ensure that, when persons who consider themselves wronged because the principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them establish, before a court or other competent authority, facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination" and "it shall be for the respondent to prove that there has been no breach of the principle of equal treatment".
The introduction of a system of a reversed burden of proof may lead to an interference with basic rights of the respondent. From the perspective of constitutional law, the fair trial guarantee, the principle of proportionality (both deduced from the Rechtsstaatsprinzip), the right to a hearing in accordance with the law (Art. 103 (1) A deviation from the ordinary rules according to which each party has the burden of proof for preconditions, which are favourable for it, is only consistent with the Basic Law if the application of the ordinary rule leads to serious and socially unbearable results. 65 In cases of racial discrimination, the victims have to be protected, since they are apparently the weaker side and particularly vulnerable, 66 and the retention of the ordinary rule might lead to socially unbearable results. It is also virtually impossible to assess the mental state and motivation of the respondent. But even if the legislator came to the result that the introduction of a reversed burden of proof is not proportional, a provision similar to Section 319c has to be adopted since it is required by secondary European Community law.
Excurse: Prohibited Grounds of Discrimination not Mentioned in the Race Equality Directive
As explained above, the legal basis for an assessment of the legality of an antidiscrimination act beyond the scope of secondary European law are solely the basic constitutional rights. In the discussion process regarding the Discussion Draft Law on the Prevention of Discrimination in the Private Sector and its conformity with the constitution, the introduction of "sexual identity" 67 as a ground for discrimination was considered a violation of the constitutional principle of the protection of marriage and family (Art. 6 (1) of the Basic Law). 68 This is in fact not the case. On 17 July 2002, the German Federal Constitutional Court approved the Equal Treatment Act regarding Homosexual Partnerships ( Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz). The Court came to the conclusion that the legislator has the mandate to protect persons living in a homosexual partnership against discrimination and to support the free development of their personality deriving from Art. 2 (1) and 3 (1), (3) of the Basic Law. 69 The Discrimination in the Private Sector also encompassed the prohibited grounds of discrimination on gender, religion or belief and disability. Unlike the ground of sexual identity these are explicitly mentioned in Art. 3 (2) or (3). The constitutional mandate to outlaw discrimination encompasses, therefore, these grounds as well. Generally, an act which outlaws direct discrimination in the private sector on grounds of gender, sexual identity, religion or belief, and disability would be consistent with the Basic Law. Art. 2 (1) and 3 (1), (3) of the Basic Law encourage the legislator to adopt measures against direct discrimination on the grounds mentioned above.
V. Consequences of a Failure to Adopt an Anti-Discrimination Law in the Prescribed Period
Another issue to be discussed is the question of what the consequences will be if Germany (or another member state) should fail to comply with the Race Equality Directive in the time limit set by Art. 16. In this case it has to be examined whether the substantive part of the Race Equality Directive would apply directly.
Normally, directives do not apply directly. They "shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods". 70 Thus, directives influence the national law making process only indirectly. 71 However, directives may apply directly when a member state fails to implement a directive in the prescribed period or where it implements the directive incorrectly. As constantly pointed out by the 
